Cooperating with the Soviets in Space

These twin discussions of intelligence information available to Kennedy on the Soviet space program and of Soviet attempts to persuade the United States that there was no moon race help set the stage for this chapter's final topic US-Soviet space cooperation and Kennedy's September 1963 offer of a joint lunar program. Hopeful rhetoric concerning cooperation was present in Kennedy's speeches from his first day in office. In his inaugural address he said, Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders...

The MOL as a Reconnaissance Platform

It is important to understand that the MOL was conceived of, designed, and evaluated as a reconnaissance-gathering system. The difficulty with this concept is that it was not publicly discussed as such. Open testimony and unclassified documents of the time consistently described it as a system that will be able to test and evaluate experimental equipment and determine man's ability to use the equipment in the discrimination, evaluation, filtering, and disposal of data.33 Observers knowledgeable...

Johnson International Cooperation in Space and the Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty was perhaps the most heralded of the agreements directly relevant to the space arena indicative of some closing of the gap between the USSR and the United States. It was one of two developments in the international cooperation in space field during the Johnson administration, both of which were extensions of initiatives that began during Kennedy's term. The other was the fact that the Dryden-Blagonravov talks and initiatives resulting from them continued. However, neither...

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Van Dyke, Pride and Power, 27. 123. Murray and Cox, Apollo, 88. 124. Lambright, Powering Apollo, 187. 126. Hirsch and Trento, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 115. 127. House, Committee on Government Operations, H. Rep. 445, 4 June 1965, 74. 128. Ibid. A NASA meteorological satellite, Nimbus, had cost overruns of 9 million by mid-1963 in a total contract of 22 million. An orbiting astronomical observatory had cost overruns of 34 million in a 92-million contract. 129....

An Addendum Reconnaissance Satellites and Space Policy in the Kennedy Administration

Within days of its beginning, the Kennedy administration tightened and extended Eisenhower's policies on releasing information concerning reconnaissance satellites in particular and military space launches in general. An OSD official explained to Kennedy that the information the DOD planned to release to the media on upcoming Samos launches represents a severe reduction from what had previously been issued. Eliminated from former procedures are four pages comprising 22 questions and answers....

Overview of Gemini and the DODs Role

On 14 April 1961, NASA offered a study contract to the McDonnell Corporation for an improved version of the Mercury spacecraft. This Mercury Mark II would increase the size of the original Mercury capsule by approximately 50 percent, so it could carry two astronauts instead of one. In addition, significant hardware modifications to the capsule would enable it to conduct advanced missions such as rendezvous, docking, and transfer of humans and material, as well as extravehicular activity (EVA)...

Eisenhower Prestige and Human Spaceflight

Before plunging into the programmatic details of Dynasoar and Mercury, however, it is necessary to examine the last relevant component of Eisenhower's space policy What were his views on using human spaceflight as a competitive tool for winning prestige in the Cold War struggle with the USSR after NASA's establishment Evidence presented thus far indicates he was not keen on the notion before October 1958. Nor would he endorse the idea of a human-spaceflight race after NASA began operations....

Interservice Rivalry and the Creation of the ARPA

In the military's post-Sputnik program, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency launched Explorer I America's first satellite on 31 January 1958. As the post-Sputnik clamor grew for an American satellite and it was clear that the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard program could not easily be accelerated, Eisenhower told the DOD on 8 October to do what is necessary to have the Redstone ready as a backup.120 In response the secretary of defense authorized the Army on 8 November 1957 to configure a...

Division of Labor

The division of labor process started on 2 April 1958, the same day Eisenhower submitted his version of the Space Act to Congress. He wrote the SECDEF and the NACA chairman to explain his philosophy concerning which organization would do what under the new legislation It is appropriate that a civilian agency of the Government take the lead in those activities related to space which extend beyond the responsibilities customarily considered to be those of a military organization. Eisenhower said...

No Race for Prestige

The other major objective of Eisenhower's space policy, during the period after Sputnik I and leading up to the creation of NASA, was his desire to avoid a crash speculative program in a race for prestige. Hagerty, Eisenhower's press secretary, emphasized this point when he briefed the press the day after Sputnik, saying that I would also like to make it quite clear that the Soviet launching did not come as any surprise and that we have never thought of our program as one which was in a race...

The Air Force Reacted

The tension between top-level Air Force leadership and Mc-Namara's OSD grew quickly to a high level. After White retired as CSAF in June 1961, he could honestly express himself I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional 'defense intellectuals' who have been brought into this nation's capital. I don't believe a lot of these overconfident, sometimes arrogant professors, mathematicians, and other theorists have sufficient worldliness or...

Space for Peace

The interrelated complex of reconnaissance satellites, freedom of space, and space for peace set the tenor not only for international cooperation in space as well as the overall Eisenhower space policy but also set the stage for the NASA-DOD institutional relationship. Historians must be clear as to the central importance of reconnaissance satellites and the asso ciated idea of freedom of space which, when combined with space for scientific research, formed the space-for-peace policy outlined...

The Concept of the AAP

There are a number of allusions above to NASA's Apollo Application Program. The discussion now turns to a brief survey of its origins and early evolution. This treatment need not be as comprehensive as that of the MOL for two reasons. First, the AAP's ultimate programmatic execution came in the 1970s, primarily with the three Skylab missions and is, therefore, outside the scope of this study. Second, this author is convinced that the role played by the perceived duplication with the AAP in the...

Use Apollo Saturn Hardware for the MOL or Vice Versa

A closely related question asked why the DOD could not use NASA's preexisting Apollo-Saturn hardware for its MOL. Or, conversely, why could not NASA use the hardware that DOD was developing with the Gemini B-MOL-Titan III combination to conduct the experiments it wanted to do in the AAP This question differs from the duplication question in that the duplication issue focused on whether or not one entire system should be merged with the other. The hardware question presumed both systems would...

The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

Therefore, the only result of consequence from the attempt to revise the Space Act throughout late 1959 and 1960 was the AACB. The AACB would function throughout the 1960s with a higher degree of importance than the CMLC. It and its six panels met regularly not to engage in the policy-making function but to ensure proper coordination between NASA and the DOD efforts in certain space technology fields.136 Any decisions concerning improving coordination or reducing duplication were usually...

Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation

In a conference with his advisors on 8 October 1957, President Eisenhower set the tone saying, His intent was not to belittle the Russian accomplishment. He would like, however, to allay histeria sic and alarm, and to bring out that the Russian action is simply proof of a thrust mechanism of a certain power, accuracy and reliability.5 NSC's OCB issued guidance that same day instructing agencies of the government to play down competitive aspects and implication of a 'race.'. . . Keep the...

Webb McNamara and Space Stations

One bone of contention resulting from the NASA-DOD Gemini agreement of January 1963 was at exactly what point in NASA's exploratory space-station studies was NASA required to obtain mutual agreement with the DOD that it was not initiat ing major new programs or projects in the field of manned space flight aimed chiefly at the attainment of experimental or other capabilities in near-earth orbit 91 McNamara took a restrictive view of this clause, believing that DOD should be involved in NASA...

The Final Product

Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law (PL) 85-568, on 29 July 1958. Its tasking lan guage still contained the House's R& D proviso but was, overall, a victory for the Senate's interpretation. NASA then and now exercises control over, has responsibility for, and directs US aeronautical and space activities, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United...

DOD Experiments on Gemini

By the spring of 1964, NASA and the DOD had jointly selected a total of 23 experiments for the Gemini flights, 10 of which were reserved for the DOD. NASA was very careful in its description of some of the more sensitive DOD experiments. For instance, one was titled Visual Definition of Objects that NASA defined as the exploration of the technical problem areas associated with man's use of visual and optical equipment during spaceflight. Commercially available photo optical equipment will be...

The AAPs Origins and Early Evolution through Late 1965

The ambiguity surrounding NASA's future plans meant that the AAP got off to a rocky start and had significant difficulty being defined. NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications Homer Newell wrote, During the muddy period of planning for an Apollo Applications Program that was not going to sell, Webb often stated to his colleagues in NASA that he did not sense on the Hill or in the administration the support that would be needed to undertake another large space project. He...

NASAs Predecessor Organization and the DOD

Between 1908 and 1913, the United States spent only 435,000 on aviation development, less than nations such as Japan, China, Bulgaria, Greece, and Brazil. As a result, when World War I began in 1914, the United States had only 23 military aircraft, all technologically obsolete, when compared to France with 1,400, Germany with 1,000, Russia with 800, and England with 400.74 In the wartime environment, most European governments encouraged their scientists, engineers, and governments to further...

Prepresidential Attitudes and Statements

In an address to the District Democratic Meeting in Topeka, Kansas, 7 November 1957, a month after Sputnik, Kennedy said the United States was losing the satellite-missile race with the USSR because of complacent miscalculations, penny-pinching, budget cutbacks, incredibly confused mismanagements and wasteful rivalries and jealousies. Kennedy called for Eisenhower to tell us exactly where we stand today and where we go from here. The people of America are no longer willing to be lulled by...